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For sale: Window to the Soul
Eye Tracking as the Impetus for Federal
Biometric Data Protection
Ian Taylor Logan*
ABSTRACT
Eye tracking has existed as an important tool in numerous fields since
the 1950s. Today, eye tracking hardware is smaller, cheaper, and more
accurate than ever. As a result, eye tracking is anticipated to be ubiquitous
within Virtual Reality (VR) headsets as a way to increase calibration
accuracy, as well as the user’s sense of immersion. Despite the importance
of eye tracking data to the fields of marketing, behavioral science, and
neuroscience, sparse literature has been published regarding the privacy
implications of collecting such data from unwary consumers in an age
where the collection of data through Internet-connected devices is largely
unregulated. The purpose of this Comment is twofold: (1) to highlight a
few of the numerous types of sensitive information that can be derived
from eye-tracking data, and (2) to demonstrate an urgent requirement for
legislation that comprehensively protects biometric identifiers from sale
and exploitation.
The current pace of legislative enactment (itself a dramatic foil to the
explosive rate of technological innovation) indicates that the best way to
promote user privacy as well as innovation is to promulgate laws that
create a right of personal privacy in biometric identifiers, instead of laws
that regulate technology. Several statutes designed to regulate technology,
rather than protecting the data it can collect, have proven that such
schemes are minimally effective at best, and require constant amendment
and re-negotiation to the point of impotence. This Comment argues that if
privacy rights are established regarding biometric identifiers,
technological innovation will be welcomed with less friction, allowing for
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more rapid growth in a market supported by eager and informed
consumers.
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INTRODUCTION

In 2013, Alicia Puente Cackley, then Director of Financial Markets
and Community Investment for the U.S. Government Accountability
Office, addressed the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and
Transportation. In her words:
The Federal laws that address the types of consumer information that
can be collected and shared are not comprehensive. Under most
circumstances, information that many people may consider very
personal or sensitive can be collected, shared, and used for marketing.
This can include information about physical and mental health, income
and assets, political affiliations, and sexual habits and orientation.1

In the years since Cackley’s address, her causes for concern have not
abated; the perils associated with data privacy have only become more dire
as technology becomes more engaging, pervasive, and invasive.2
Virtual and Augmented Reality (VR, AR) have existed at the
periphery of the commercial technology market for decades.3 As hardware
becomes less expensive and software more sophisticated, society stands at
the threshold of a massive cultural shift. No longer a question of if, but
when, commercial VR presents a new vehicle by which creators,
architects, retailers, and advertisers can reach consumers. While fervor for
VR and AR bubbles beneath the surface of the mainstream, the federal
government seems blind to the inevitable shift in implications of this new
technology.
Cackley’s remarks reflect the understanding that the Internet has
developed into an unregulated playground for companies, engendering
concerns about what sorts of consumer information can be collected,
analyzed, sold or otherwise exploited.4 Without regulation, targeted
advertising has become more prevalent and more relevant to consumers,

1. What Information Do Data Brokers Have On Consumers and How Do They Use
It?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., & Transp., 113th Cong. 60 (2013)
[hereinafter Data Brokers Hearing].
2. See infra Section II.A.
3. See Craig E. Engler, Affordable VR by 1994, COMPUTER GAMING WORLD, Nov.
1992, at 80, 80, http://bit.ly/2LcWxvm. In 1992, several companies including Nintendo,
Spectrum HoloByte, Visions of Reality, and Sense8 were working on hardware and
software for VR. Id. Virtuality, the VR benchmark at the time, was designed by W
Industries. Id. Companies rumored to be creating content for VR included Walt Disney and
MCA (now Universal Pictures Home Entertainment). Id. at 81. It was speculated that
commercially viable, in-home VR systems would be available by 1994. Id.
4. Data Brokers Hearing, supra note 1, at 6–7 (Staff Rep. for Sen. Rockefeller,
Chairman, S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., & Transp.) (offering a sample of information
collected by data brokers including personal characteristics and preferences, health and
financial information, vehicle, ailments, pets and shampoo purchases).
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but increased revenue in the data mining industry has sparked debate over
the balance between consumer and company benefit of data use.5
Debates about benefits conferred to consumers seldom account for
the deeply personal nature of some of the most valuable consumer data.6
Likewise, the benefits of more relevant advertisements do nothing to
mitigate the fact that consumers, by and large, have no say as to what
information is collected, to whom it is sold, and how it is used after its
collection.
Consumer data has been collected, analyzed, and sold for decades,7
and its use is often seen as an imperative for competitive businesses to
thrive.8 Deeply entrenched in today’s online business paradigm, a
substantial decline in data collection is beyond the realm of reasonable
possibility. However, the potential of VR to drastically shift the ways in
which society consumes digital content calls for federal legislation to
protect a specific and acutely sensitive form of consumer data: biometrics.9
This Comment will begin with a discussion of the various
applications of eye-tracking data and its place in consumer technology,
leading into a discussion of state, national, and international biometric data
protection.10 The following section will offer an analysis of the
inadequacies of the current federal data protection framework.11 The final
section will advocate for the enactment of a federal biometric data
protection statute, listing several components that are imperative for a
comprehensive and effective law.12
II.

BACKGROUND

While eye-tracking data is one of the most sensitive forms of data,
the eyes are far from the most frequently-exploited form of biometric
5. See id. at 65 (statement of Alicia Puente Cackley, Dir. of Fin. Mkts. & Cmty. Inv.,
U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office) (“Advertising representatives noted that targeted
marketing and advertising helps underwrite applications and services available free to
consumers. Some resellers said that targeted behavioral advertising gives consumers
information relevant to their specific interests, needs, or preferences. However, some
privacy advocates believe that consumer benefits have been overstated.”); cf. John
Shaeffer, The Economics of Online Privacy, FORBES (Mar. 26, 2012, 01:19 PM),
https://bit.ly/2AlbIia (arguing many privacy advocates are out of touch with what
consumers want, and that opt-in data tracking defaults would decimate the current online
advertising paradigm).
6. See infra Section II.A.
7. Data Brokers Hearing, supra note 1, at 7 (Staff Rep. for Sen. Rockefeller,
Chairman, S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., & Transp.).
8. See Thomas H. Davenport, Competing on Analytics, HARV. BUS. REV. (Jan. 2006),
https://hbr.org/2006/01/competing-on-analytics.
9. See infra Section IV.
10. See infra Section II.
11. See infra Section III.
12. See infra Section IV.
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identifiers.13 Currently finger-prints and face-prints are among the more
popular, known for their use in unlocking phones or tagging friends in
photos.14 As VR and AR products develop, however, eyes may become a
key identifier of tech users.15
A.

Biometric Data and its Applications

Biometrics measure “physiological characteristics like—but not
limited to—fingerprint, iris patterns, or facial features that can be used to
identify an individual.”16 While eye-tracking data takes many forms,17 iris
and retina scans18 are used to identify an individual like a fingerprint.19
Unlike a fingerprint, behavioral and cognitive information can be derived
from eye tracking,20 pupillometry,21 and spontaneous blink rate.22
Eye tracking data is collected when the saccades23 and fixations of
the eye are captured by a beam of near-infrared light bouncing off the
13. See Bob Violino, Biometric Security is on the Rise, CSO (Mar. 3, 2015, 3:48 AM),
https://bit.ly/2ljRGPw.
14. Id.; see also Fingerprints: The Most Popular Biometric, INAUTH (Jan. 9, 2017),
https://bit.ly/2S1UHiP.
15. Danny Thakkar, Top Five Biometrics: Face, Fingerprint, Iris, Palm and Voice,
BAYOMETRICS (Jan. 23, 2017), https://bit.ly/2OKNnq1 (ranking iris scanning as “the most
accurate biometric system,” despite substantial investment costs); see also TOBII GAMING,
https://tobiigaming.com/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2018) (offering multiple forms of eyetracking integration, and over one hundred eye-tracking-equipped PC games).
16. Biometrics, NAT’L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH. (Feb. 2, 2010),
https://www.nist.gov/programs-projects/biometrics.
17. See Maria K. Eckstein et al., Beyond Eye Gaze: What Else Can Eyetracking Reveal
About Cognition and Cognitive Development?, 25 DEV. COGNITIVE NEUROSCI. 69, 70–73
(2017) (delineating eye gaze, pupillometry and spontaneous blink rate as common ocular
measurements and fixation, saccades, and scan path as gaze metrics).
18. See CLIFFORD S. FISHMAN & ANNE T. MCKENNA, WIRETAPPING AND
EAVESDROPPING: SURVEILLANCE IN THE INTERNET AGE § 31:10 (3d ed. 2007). An iris scan
“measures the outer and inner edge of the iris as well as hundreds of other sections,”
allowing researchers to record minute changes in dilation. Id. Retina scans require “the
individual [to] look directly into a beam of light, which reflects off the retina . . . and the
scanner takes measurements of the pattern created by the reflected light,” allowing
researchers to record the viewer’s eye movement and attention. Id. at § 31:9.
19. See id at § 31:9 (explaining how iris and retinal patterns “are unique, even between
identical twins, and static enough to be used throughout life.”).
20. See generally Dario D. Salvucci & Joseph H. Goldberg, Identifying Fixations and
Saccades in Eye-Tracking Protocols, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE EYE TRACKING RESEARCH
AND APPLICATIONS SYMPOSIUM 71, 71 (2000) (offering several contexts in which
researchers have utilized eye tracking).
21. See generally Simona Graur & Greg Siegle, Pupillary Motility: Bringing
Neuroscience to the Psychiatry Clinic of the Future, CURRENT NEUROLOGY & NEUROSCI.
REPS., (June 19, 2013), https://doi.org/10.1007/s11910-013-0365-0 (discussing the myriad
applications of pupil measurement in psychiatry and other fields).
22. See Eckstein et al., supra note 17, at 80.
23. “Saccades are rapid, ballistic movements of the eyes that abruptly change the point
of fixation.” Types of Eye Movements and Their Functions, in NEUROSCIENCE (Dale Purves
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retina as the eye moves across a screen or environment.24 This data can
then be stored for further analysis.25 Eye movement, like breathing, can be
controlled by the individual, but is more commonly a subconscious,26 or
reflexive27 movement, resulting in more “truthful” data than that gathered
in a survey or a study of conscious decision-making.28 Stated another way,
where a person looks may provide more accurate information than a
survey or interview. One study suggests that “gaze reveals developing
preferences for moral choices,” and that through eye tracking a moral
decision can be anticipated, manipulated, and even changed based on
patterns of eye movement and timed interruption of the thought process.29
Changes in pupil dilation, or pupillometry, has also been used to study the
process of decision-making.30
The same technology that can track eye movement can also measure
pupil dilation,31 and is used to study neurocognitive arousal as it applies to
task-engagement.32 Studies indicate that certain pupil dilation anomalies
are indicative of psychiatric conditions such as depression, and can be used
to identify non-depressed individuals who are prone to depression.33 Both
pupillometric and gaze-tracking data can be used to identify “key features”
of Autism Spectrum Disorder,34 “such as empathy in adults and children
as young as two years old.”35
In addition, certain systemic diseases like Parkinson’s and
Alzheimer’s can have specific impacts on eye movement that can be

et
al.
eds.,
2d
ed.
2001)
(ebook)
[hereinafter
Eye
Movements],
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK10991/.
24. What is Eye Tracking and How Does It Work?, IMOTIONS (Jan. 12, 2016)
[hereinafter What is Eye Tracking?], https://imotions.com/blog/eye-tracking-work/
(“Near-infrared light is directed towards the center of the eyes . . . causing visible
reflections [which] are tracked by a camera.”).
25. Id.
26. See Mo Costandi, How Your Eyes Betray Your Thoughts, THE GUARDIAN (June 2,
2015), http://bit.ly/2RQ846n.
27. See Eye Movements, supra note 23.
28. See Adi Robertson, Tobii Lets You Play Assassins Creed With Your Eyes, VERGE
(Jan. 8, 2016, 6:19 PM), https://www.theverge.com/2016/1/8/10736510/tobii-eyetracking-assassins-creed-vr-ces-2016.
29. See Philip Pärnamets et al., Biasing Moral Decisions by Exploiting the Dynamics
of Eye Gaze, 112 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCIS. 4170, 4173 (2015).
30. See id.; see also Graur & Siegle, supra note 21.
31. Are Pupil Size Calculations Possible With Tobii Eye Trackers?, TOBII PRO
[hereinafter Tobii Eye Trackers], https://bit.ly/2CYhGbh (last visited Dec. 9, 2018).
32. See Peter R. Murphy et al., Pupil-Linked Arousal Determines Variability in
Perceptual Decision Making, PLOS COMPUTATIONAL BIOLOGY, Sept. 2014, at 1, 6
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pcbi.1003854.
33. See Graur & Siegle, supra note 21.
34. See id.
35. Id.
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observed in eye-tracking data.36 A 2015 release from Johns Hopkins
Medicine notes that eye-tracking goggles are superior to MRI and CT
scans for identifying evidence of stroke.37 Another study asserts that,
“[d]espite being an indirect measure of brain function,” eye tracking offers
more advantages than electroencephalograms (EEG) and functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) in cognitive studies.38
Key differences between eye-tracking studies are now found in how
the data is collected, but rather how the raw data is analyzed in conjunction
with the stimuli used to elicit the data.39 Theoretically, the same tools can
be used to diagnose autism as can be used to determine which of two soup
can labels is more attention-grabbing.40 This type of information has
obvious and significant value to employers, insurance providers,
pharmaceutical companies, and others within the health care field, all of
which are currently able to purchase this data from private data collection
firms without federal restriction.41
Outside the realm of diseases and disorders, behavioral scientists
have used eye tracking to study the subtle differences in how individuals
of different sexes respond to sexual stimuli.42 Study results suggest that
36. See Daniele Cruz & Erin L. Boyle, Neurologic Disorders Have Varied Ocular
Symptoms, OCULAR SURGERY NEWS (July 1, 2006), https://bit.ly/2JfgAs9.
37. Eye-Tracking Devices Helps Detect Stroke, JOHNS HOPKINS MED. (Sept. 1, 2015),
https://bit.ly/2PegKoX. For $40, the eye-tracking procedure boasts 99 percent accuracy
compared to the reported 80 percent accuracy of a $1500 MRI or the 16 percent accuracy
of a $300 CT scan. Id.
38. See Eckstein et al., supra note 17, at 70. The mobility and portability of the
headsets or screen trackers make for study environments more natural and comfortable
than the “noisy and space-restricted environment of the MRI scanner.” Id. Equipment can
also be brought to schools, hospitals, and care centers, giving studies a broader, more
diverse study pool. Id. Importantly, accuracy does not suffer, as the eye tracking sampling
rates are fast enough (up to 2,000 measurements per second as of 2016) to rival the
temporal resolution of an EEG. Id.
39. See Tobii Eye Trackers, supra note 31 (Tobii eye tracking hardware collects both
occulomotor and pupillometric data); see also Tobii Pro Studio, TOBII PRO [hereinafter
Tobii Pro Studio], https://bit.ly/2J9siEC (Tobii Pro Studio software boasts its efficacy in
studying marketing and research as well as psychology.).
40. Cf. Tobii Pro Studio, supra note 39.
41. Ieuan Jolly, Data Protection in the United States: Overview, THOMPSON REUTERS
PRACTICAL LAW (Oct. 1, 2018), https://tmsnrt.rs/2J8Ik1r (“In the US, there is no single,
comprehensive federal (national) law regulating the collection and use of personal data . . .
Instead, the US has a patchwork system of federal and state laws and regulations that can
sometimes overlap, dovetail and contradict one another.”).
42. See Amy D. Lykins et al., Sex Differences in Visual Attention to Erotic and NonErotic Stimuli, 37 ARCHIVES SEXUAL BEHAV. 219, 226 (2008) (finding that heterosexual
men look at the opposite sex significantly longer than heterosexual women, and
heterosexual women seem to “disperse their attention evenly between opposite and same
sex figures” when presented in an erotic context). See generally Heather A. Rupp & Kim
Wallen, Sex Differences in Viewing Sexual Stimuli: An Eye-Tracking Study in Men and
Women, 51 HORMONES & BEHAV. 524 (2007) [hereinafter Rupp & Wallen, Sex
Differences] (noting a measurable difference in the pupillary responses of men, women,
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purchasers of biometric data could determine the sexual preference,
propensities, and perhaps contraception use of an individual based on eyetracking data.43 Studies of women and men, as well as female-centric eye
tracking studies, show that hormone fluctuation impacts eye-gaze and
pupil dilation.44 These minute fluctuations can point to when, during a
menstrual cycle, the pupillometric data was collected.45 Use of oral
contraception (birth control) has been detectable in such studies as well.46
Without question, sexual orientation, hormone fluctuation, and use of
contraception are as personal to an individual as they are valuable to a
company. Ignoring the intrinsically private nature of such information, to
leave companies free to exploit it is indefensible.
B.

Eye Tracking Within the Internet of Things

Although eye tracking is not yet ubiquitous in consumer tech, its
impact may be massive. Rapid developments in technology have created
a pervasive, and somewhat nebulous network of devices referred to as the
Internet of Things (IoT).47 The moniker refers to the interconnectivity of
any devices—smart-watches, refrigerators, vehicles, headphones, and
smart assistants—that are able to connect and assimilate into the broad
network of the Internet.48 As VR and AR software, headgear, and
and women on contraceptives to sexual stimuli). Patterns involving temporal length of gaze
or the division of attention between figures of different sexes may betray the sex of the
viewer, if not the viewer’s sexual preferences. See Gerulf Rieger & Ritch C. SavinWilliams, The Eyes Have It: Sex and Sexual Orientation Differences in Pupil Dilation
Patterns, PLOS ONE, Aug. 2012, at 1, 6–8, https://bit.ly/2Yoruq0.
43. Rupp & Wallen, Sex Differences, supra note 42, at 525; see also Rieger & SavinWilliams, supra note 42, at 6–8.
44. See Bruno Laeng & Liv Falkenberg, Women’s Pupillary Responses to Sexually
Significant Others During the Hormonal Cycle, 52 HORMONES & BEHAV. 520, 527 (2007)
(explaining that “by monitoring the physiological parameter of pupillary size we can
measure women’s changes in attention towards targets of sexual desire and successfully
tap into a high-level psychological appraisal of affective–sexual interest”); Rupp & Wallen,
Sex Differences, supra note 42, at 524. See generally Rieger & Savin-Williams, supra note
42.
45. Laeng & Falkenberg, supra note 44, at 527 (“The findings confirmed the presence
of cyclic differences in pupillary diameters while watching facial portraits of sexually
interesting individuals.”). “Cyclic” here refers to the ovulatory, luteal, and menstrual
phases of the menstrual cycle. Id.
46. See id. (“Remarkably, the participants using contraceptive pills did not show
cyclic fluctuations of pupil sizes.”).
47. FED. TRADE COMM’N, INTERNET OF THINGS: PRIVACY & SECURITY IN A CONNECTED
WORLD 6 (2015) [hereinafter FTC, INTERNET OF THINGS], http://bit.ly/2Eexg2f (defining
the IoT as “‘things’ such as devices or sensors—other than computers, smartphones, or
tablets—that connect, communicate or transmit information with or between each other
through the Internet.”).
48. Jacob Morgan, A Simple Explanation of the Internet of Things, FORBES (May 13,
2014), https://bit.ly/2Akj8SD.
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spectacles make their way into the commercial market, the use of these
devices for gaming, home entertainment, and creative expression will
demand Internet connectivity. Tobii, one of the foremost purveyors of eyetracking equipment, has been integral to the introduction of eye tracking
to virtual reality hardware, and already markets laptops equipped with eyetracking software to enhance research and gaming experiences.49 The
inextricable link between games and the web ensures that VR and AR will
be part of the estimated 50 billion devices that will fall under the expansive
umbrella of the IoT by 2020.50
Increases in accuracy and sophistication, coupled with reasonable
prices51 make eye tracking features appealing to both marketers and
entertainers.52 For example, foveated rendering (a process that uses eye
tracking to understand where and how the human eye focuses to make
content more immersive and visuals more life-like) has been applied in
VR software to enhance video game environments and training
simulations.53 Foveated rendering relies on pupillary motility and
necessarily requires the collection of biometric data any time a user
engages with a virtual or augmented environment.54 The remarkable
increase in calibration and immersion made possible by eye tracking all
but ensures that it will become standard in commercial VR and AR
hardware.55
Advertising and marketing companies have used eye-tracking
technology for years to analyze the efficacy of supermarket layouts,
product labels, advertisements, and displays.56 Compounded with studies
of eye movement that reveal individual details about attention, arousal,

49. Devindra Hardawar, Tobii Proves that Eye Tracking is VR’s Next Killer Feature,
ENGADGET (Jan 13, 2018), https://engt.co/2S7KMtd.
50. FTC, INTERNET OF THINGS, supra note 47, at 1; see also S. 88, 115th Cong.
§2(a)(2) (2017).
51. What is Eye Tracking?, supra note 24; see also Eye Tracker Prices – An Overview
of 15+ Eye Trackers, IMOTIONS (Jan. 12, 2016), https://bit.ly/2OBICnA.
52. See Salvucci & Goldberg, supra note 20.
53. Paul Miller, Nvidia’s Foveated Rendering Tricks for VR Could Improve Graphics
and Immersion, VERGE (Jul 22, 2016, 5:23 PM), https://bit.ly/2AlVPI5. Foveated rendering
processes the path of the viewer’s pupils and maintains high quality imagery in their direct
line of sight, while the image at the viewer’s periphery and beyond their sight renders at a
lower quality. Id. This process creates a viewing experience more akin to how the eye
process images, and the use of lower quality images allows the headset to operate more
efficiently on slower processors. Id.; see also Hardawar, supra note 49.
54. Hardawar, supra note 49.
55. Id. (noting that “[a]ccurate eye tracking delivers a better sense of presence . . . the
ultimate goal for virtual reality.”). Tobii CEO Henrik Eskilsson noted that VR will
eventually require eye tracking. Id.
56. See Marketing and Consumer Research, TOBII PRO (2017), https://bit.ly/2OBIFQi
(discussing different marketing studies in which eye tracking has been utilized).
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decision-making, and memory,57 eye-tracking data is an immensely
valuable resource to marketers in pursuit of the most engaging and
efficient advertising campaigns.58
Although marketing and neurology may seem like disparate fields,
eye-tracking studies within both rely on the same fundamental technology
and the same form of biometric data to learn about an individual.59 When
eye-tracking data is collected from a device, such as a VR headset or AR
spectacles, this data can be analyzed by companies60 against extant eyetracking studies to extrapolate information about users that was not
volunteered nor related to the device from which the data was collected.61
Stated another way, a marketing agency could theoretically purchase data
from a VR video game producer, compare the eye-tracking data to
behavioral studies about teen impulse control, and use that information to
sell clothing to that video game’s target demographic. The broad
application and intrinsic value of such personal data combines to increase
incentives for companies to retain, use, and sell eye-tracking data in the
absence of prohibitive laws.
C.

A Lack of Federal Biometric Privacy Protection

Despite its value and sensitivity, the federal government currently has
no comprehensive laws in place to protect the biometric data of U.S.
citizens. In 2013, the Senate Commerce Committee issued a report on the
status of individual privacy and the data collected by “data brokers.”62 The
report acknowledged:
Current law generally allows resellers [of data] to collect personal
information from sources including warranty registration cards,
surveys, and online sources such as discussion boards, social media
57. Eckstein, supra note 17, at 87.
58. FED. TRADE COMM’N, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID
CHANGE 37 (2010) [hereinafter FTC, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY],
http://bit.ly/2zRagDC (“[T]he more information that is known about a consumer, the more
a company will pay to deliver a precisely-targeted advertisement to him.”).
59. See generally What’s Your Field?, TOBII PRO (2017), https://bit.ly/2LZbggx
(suggesting that any Tobii product, utilizing the same fundamental technology, will assist
in any realm of research or study).
60. See FTC, INTERNET OF THINGS, supra note 47, at 15.
61. See Scott R. Peppet, Regulating the Internet of Things: First Steps Toward
Managing Discrimination, Privacy, Security, and Consent, 93 TEX. L. REV. 85, 93 (2014)
(“[E]ach type of consumer sensor (e.g., personal health monitor, automobile black box, or
smart grid meter) can be used for many purposes beyond that particular sensor’s original
use or context, particularly in combination with data from other [IoT] devices.”).
62. FTC, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY, supra note 58, at 68 (defining data brokers
as “companies that collect information, including personal information about consumers,
from a wide variety of sources for the purpose of reselling such information to their
customers for various purposes . . . .”).
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sites, blogs, and web browsing histories and searches. Current law does
not require disclosure to consumers when their information is collected
from these sources.63

The committee further announced that “no federal statute provides
consumers the right to learn what information is held about them and who
holds it for marketing or look-up purposes.”64 Nor does any law require
companies selling consumer data “to allow individuals to review [their]
personal information . . . control its use, or correct it.”65 As a result, the
collection, dissemination, and regulation of consumer data is largely left
in the hands of the companies and data brokers who profit from collection,
analysis, use, and resale of consumer data, including biometrics.
1. Federal Trade Commission
The agency predominantly responsible for consumer privacy
protection is the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). Section 5 of the FTC
Act of 191466 (“FTC Act”) declares “unfair or deceptive acts or practices
in or affecting commerce”67 to be unlawful-a broad authority, most often
applied (in the realm of privacy) to cases involving the collection of data
that is inconsistent with a particular company’s terms of agreement.68
The FTC’s jurisdiction reaches nearly all facets of trade affecting
commerce, not simply matters of data privacy.69 The array of issues
handled by the FTC means data privacy claims are not the sole concern of
the FTC. As such, investigations are typically launched on behalf of large
classes of plaintiffs.70

63. Data Brokers Hearing, supra note 1, at 60 (statement of Alicia Puente Cackley,
Dir. of Fin. Mkts. & Cmty. Inv., U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office).
64. Id. at 59.
65. Id.
66. Federal Trade Commission Act of 1914 § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 41 (2012 & Supp. 2017).
67. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (2012 & Supp. 2017).
68. See, e.g., Google Will Pay $22.5 Million to Settle FTC Charges it Misrepresented
Privacy Assurances to Users of Apple’s Safari Internet Browser, FED. TRADE COMM’N
(Aug. 9, 2012), https://bit.ly/1qz3quA (describing how Google directly violated selfimposed protocol it had conveyed to customers, knowing that customers would rely on that
information); Operators of AshleyMadison.com Settle FTC, State Charges Resulting From
2015 Data Breach that Exposed 36 Million Users’ Profile Information, FED. TRADE
COMM’N (Dec. 14, 2016) [hereinafter Ashley Madison FTC Settlement],
https://bit.ly/2gCXcFf (“[T]he defendants assured users their personal information . . . was
private and securely protected . . . [b]ut the FTC alleges the security of
AshleyMadison.com was lax.”).
69. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a).
70. What We Do, FED. TRADE COMM’N, https://bit.ly/2oLywjq (last visited Dec. 29,
2018).
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Further, the FTC Act reserves the right to bring legal action to the
FTC,71 the U.S. Attorney General,72 or in some cases a State Attorney
General.73 Without a private cause of action, citizens have no power to
enforce the Act and protect their information on an individual basis.
Seemingly aware its lack of authority over many primary collectors
of private data, the FTC published “best practices” for the collection and
protection of consumer information.74 While the best practices encourage
data collectors to adopt more transparent75 and consumer-friendly76
practices, the best practices are in no way enforceable. Without legal
enforceability, any heightened regulation of user data is left to the
discretion of the companies collecting the data. After the Data Broker
Accountability and Transparency Act of 201577 died in Congress, the
FTC’s best practices-initially seen as an outline for future federal
legislation-became toothless suggestions to the $159 billion data broker
industry78
One week after the announcement of the Equifax data breach,79
however, the Data Broker Accountability and Transparency Act of 201780
was reintroduced in the Senate.81 The proposed bill does not prohibit the
collection or sale of any form of data; rather, the bill calls for greater ease
for consumers to access and correct the sensitive data about them that
companies are still free to collect and sell.82

71. 15 U.S.C. § 45(m)(1)(A).
72. See id. § 45(l).
73. See id. § 45b(e)(1).
74. See FTC, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY, supra note 58, 15–16.
75. See id. at 48–60.
76. See id. at 60–64.
77. Data Broker Accountability and Transparency Act of 2015, S. 668, 114th Cong.
(2015).
78. Data Brokers Hearing, supra note 1, at 2 (statement of Sen. Rockefeller,
Chairman, S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci., & Transp.).
79. See Equifax Announces Cybersecurity Incident Involving Consumer Information,
EQUIFAX (Sept. 7, 2017), http://bit.ly/2RWBUpu.
80. Data Broker Accountability and Transparency Act of 2017, S. 1815, 115th Cong.
(2017).
81. In Wake of Equifax Data Breach, Blumenthal, Colleagues Introduce Legislation
to Hold Data Broker Industry Accountable, SEN. RICHARD BLUMENTHAL (Sept. 14, 2017),
http://bit.ly/2UxJqJp.
82. Data Broker Accountability and Transparency Act of 2017, S. 1815, 115th Cong.
§ 4 (2017). As of the time of this publication, the Act has been introduced to the Senate
without final decision. See S.1815 - Data Broker Accountability and Transparency Act of
2017, CONGRESS.GOV, https://bit.ly/2qUqtmy (last visited March 12, 2019).
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2. Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act
In contrast to the current protection of adult consumer data, the
Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA)83 regulates
companies’ ability to collect and use data created by or belonging to
individuals below the age of 13.84 COPPA, enforceable by the FTC,
requires websites that knowingly collect data from children to, among
other things, (1) provide notice of data collection and receive informed
consent from parents and guardians,85 (2) permit and abide by requests of
parents to discontinue the use and collection of data,86 and (3) “prohibit
conditioning of a child’s participation” on the child’s giving of personal
data beyond what is reasonably necessary to play the game, or use the
service provided by the website.87
Promulgated in 1998, COPPA does not explicitly provide for the
protection of most biometric data, nor the vehicles88 by which such data is
likely to be collected. The statute was amended in 2013 to include mobile
apps,89 however, the statute’s broad language to regulate “operator[s] of
website[s] and online service[s],”90 still leaves open for debate the
applicability of COPPA to new devices unforeseen by past lawmakers.
3. Developing Innovation and Growing the Internet of Things Act
While the significance of biometric protection seems to elude
lawmakers, the unique characteristics and opportunities presented by the
IoT seem to have their attention. In 2015, the U.S. Senate unanimously
passed a resolution “calling for a national strategy for the development of
the Internet of Things.”91 In response, the Developing Innovation and
Growing the Internet of Things Act (DIGIT) was passed by the Senate and
currently sits with the House of Representatives for review.92 DIGIT
empowers the Secretary of Commerce to create a working group to assess
the current state of the IoT, as well as budgetary and logistical hurdles that

83. Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat.
2681-728 (1998) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6501–06 (2012 & Supp. 2017)).
84. 15 U.S.C. § 6502.
85. 15 U.S.C. § 6502(b)(1)(A).
86. 15 U.S.C. § 6502(b)(1)(B)(ii).
87. 15 U.S.C. § 6502(b)(1)(C).
88. For example, smartphones, wearable devices, and VR headsets.
89. Revised Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule Goes Into Effect Today, FED.
TRADE COMM’N (July 1, 2013), https://bit.ly/2PKBy4h.
90. 15 U.S.C. § 6502(a)(1).
91. Developing Innovation and Growing the Internet of Things Act, H.R. 686, 115th
Cong. § 2(a)(7) (2017).
92. H.R. 686: DIGIT Act, GOVTRACK, https://bit.ly/2yTuFqj (last visited Dec. 10,
2018).
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could discourage the development of the IoT.93 The duties of the working
group also prioritize the development of methods by which federal
agencies can benefit and reduce threat risks from use of the IoT.94
DIGIT also would establish a “steering committee” to advise the
working group on “policies or programs” that, among other things, (1)
“promote or are related to” privacy of IoT users, or those affected by it;95
and (2) “may enhance” IoT security.96 While such language instills hope,
privacy policies may conflict with the overarching goal of developing the
IoT, making protection of private citizens possible, but dubious.
D.

State Biometric Privacy Protection

In the absence of adequate federal protection, state statutes have
cropped up, addressing the need for more stringent and relevant privacy
laws.97 To date, only Illinois,98 California,99 Texas,100 and Washington101
have enacted statutes specifically tailored to the protection of biometric
data, although a few other states have shown interest in enacting similar
laws.102
1. Illinois & the Biometric Information Privacy Act
The first key statute enacted to comprehensively protect biometric
data was Illinois’s 2008 Biometric Information Privacy Act (BIPA).103 The
statute differs from today’s federal notions of data regulation by
addressing biometric data as something that can and should be
protected,104 rather than something that always has been, and thus will
continue to be, collected, sold, and exploited.105
93. See H.R. 686 § 4(b)(1).
94. See id. § 4(b)(4).
95. See id. § 4(e)(2)(C)(i).
96. See id. § 4(e)(2)(C)(ii).
97. See Ted Claypool & Cameron Stoll, Developing Laws Address Flourishing
Commercial Use of Biometric Information, BUS. L. TODAY (Am. Bar Ass’n), May 2016, at
1, 1–3, http://bit.ly/2QsiFaL.
98. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 14/1 (2008).
99. California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, 2018 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 55 (West)
(codified at CAL. CIV. CODE div. 3, pt. 4, tit. 1.81.5).
100. TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 503.001 (West 2017).
101. WASH. REV. CODE § 19.375 (2017).
102. Claypool & Stoll, supra note 97, at 3; Florida Proposes State Biometric Data
Privacy Legislation, HEALTH IT SECURITY (March 11, 2019), https://bit.ly/2u3yhE1;
Katherine E. Deal et al., Four More States Propose Biometric Litigation, DRINKER BIDDLE
(Feb. 14, 2017), https://bit.ly/2LCRHHK.
103. Biometric Information Privacy Act, 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14 (2008).
104. Id. 14/10.
105. See S. 1815, 115th Cong. (2017); FTC, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY, supra
note 58.
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Notably, the statute (1) requires informed consent prior to data
collection; (2) prohibits companies from profiting from consumer
biometrics; (3) outlines data protection, retention, and destruction
obligations; and (4) provides individuals with a right of action against
BIPA violators.106 To date, BIPA has not been used to assert a violation of
biometric privacy violation regarding eye tracking, iris or retina scans, or
pupillometry. However, several major companies have been successfully
prosecuted for BIPA violations regarding facial scans107—a similarly
sensitive form of biometric data.108
2. Vindication of Biometric Rights under BIPA
BIPA stands apart from other biometric statutes primarily because of
its private right of action. This key distinction has allowed consumers to
hold companies responsible for BIPA violations, while other statutes
remain effectively useless to private citizens.109
a. Facebook
In In re Facebook Biometric Info. Privacy Litig., several Illinois
citizens alleged that Facebook’s face-scanning algorithm110 violated BIPA
by scanning and storing the biometric facial scans of thousands of users
without their consent.111 Initially filed in the Northern District of Illinois,
Facebook removed to the Northern District of California and argued that
BIPA did not apply to the case because the plaintiffs had all “accepted and
agreed” to Facebook’s terms of use, which stipulated a contractual choiceof-law provision, and were therefore subject to California law in any
disputes with Facebook.112 The court agreed unequivocally that plaintiffs
were given adequate notice and had accepted and agreed to be parties to

106. 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/15.
107. See Rivera v. Google, 238 F. Supp. 3d 1088, 1093–96 (N.D. Ill. 2017); see also
infra Section II.D.2.a–.b.
108. Nowhere
to
Hide,
THE
ECONOMIST
(Sept.
9,
2017),
https://www.economist.com/leaders/2017/09/09/what-machines-can-tell-from-your-face.
109. See infra Section II.D.4.
110. Designed to recognize faces of friends to streamline the process of “tagging” those
friends in photos.
111. In re Facebook Biometric Info. Privacy Litig., 185 F. Supp. 3d 1155, 1159 (N.D.
Cal. 2016) (alleging the Tag Suggestion program violated BIPA because Facebook failed
to (1) properly inform plaintiffs that their biometric identifiers were being collected and
stored; (2) properly inform plaintiffs of the length of time and uses for which such data was
collected; (3) provide a publicly accessible schedule outlining plans to permanently delete
collected data; and (4) obtain written consent from plaintiffs to collect their biometric
identifiers).
112. Id. at 1159.
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the California choice-of-law provision.113 However, the court ultimately
found that the California choice-of-law provision was “contrary to a
fundamental policy of Illinois,”114 which gave Illinois a significantly
greater interest in the outcome of the BIPA dispute.115
The court then addressed an ambiguity within the statute.116
Facebook moved to dismiss the case, arguing that BIPA “excludes from
the definitions of ‘biometric identifier’ and ‘biometric information’ (1)
photographs and (2) any information derived from those photographs.”117
Facebook argued that the scans constituting biometric data were, “derived
exclusively from uploaded photographs.”118
The court denied the motion, noting that statutory interpretation
demanded “the Court . . . view the statute as a whole, construing words
and phrases in light of other relevant statutory provisions . . . .”119 The
court noted that, when viewed alongside the other sources marked for
exclusion,120 photographs referred to paper prints rather than digital
images.121 The court held that this interpretation of the statute aligned with
the “statute’s focus . . . on newer technology like scans of face geometry,
whose ‘full ramifications’ are not known.”122 The court further supported
its decision by observing that the same decision was reached when the
same question was raised in the Northern District of Illinois.123

113. Id. at 1167.
114. Id. at 1169. The court cited specific language of BIPA to highlight the enumerated
policy concerns of the Illinois legislature:
(1) “Biometrics are unlike other unique identifiers . . . therefore, once
compromised, the individual has no recourse, is at heightened risk for identity
theft, and is likely to withdraw from biometric-facilitated transactions”; (2)
“[t]he full ramifications of biometric technology are not fully known”; and (3)
“[t]he public welfare, security and safety will be served by regulating the
collection, use, safeguarding, handling, storage, retention, and destruction of
biometric identifiers and information”.
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 14/1 (2008)).
115. Id. (“[I]f California law is applied, the Illinois policy of protecting its citizens’
privacy interests in their biometric data . . . would be written out of existence.”). The court
balanced the “strong policy considerations favoring the enforcement of freely negotiated
choice-of-law clauses” with the likelihood “that the chosen law is contrary to a fundamental
policy” of BIPA, and that Illinois “has a materially greater interest in the determination of
the matter,” in accord with the test set out in Wash. Mut. Bank v. Super. Ct., 15 P.3d 1071
(Cal. 2001). In re Facebook, 185 F. Supp. 3d at 1168–69.
116. Id. at 1170.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1171 (citing People v. Gutman, 959 N.E.2d 621, 624 (Ill. 2011)).
120. See 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/10 (2008) (explaining that exclusions included
writing samples, demographic information, identifiable tattoos, and physical descriptors).
121. In re Facebook, 185 F. Supp. 3d at 1171.
122. Id. (quoting 740 ILL. COMP. STAT. 14/5(f) (2008)).
123. Id. at 1171 (citing Norberg v. Shutterfly, 152 F. Supp. 3d 1103 (N.D. Ill. 2015)).
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b. Shutterfly
Shutterfly, an online photo sharing, organizing, and printing
service,124 has been the defendant party twice in cases concerning BIPA
violations.
In Norberg v. Shutterfly,125 the Illinois judiciary’s first pass at
interpreting BIPA,126 the plaintiff alleged that Shutterfly collected
biometric data via facial recognition technology from individuals who
were not active users of Shutterfly’s services.127 Shutterfly filed a motion
to dismiss on the grounds Facebook would assert the following year-that
“BIPA excludes biometric identifiers . . . derived from photographs,” and
as a result, the plaintiff had not stated a claim for which relief could be
granted.128 In a brief opinion denying the motion, the court concluded that
the plaintiff filed a plausible claim because he was not a customer of the
website and was therefore not presented with a written biometrics policy,
nor given the opportunity to consent.129
Similarly, in Monroy v. Shutterfly,130 the plaintiff, a non-member and
non-user of Shutterfly’s services, alleged that a citizen of Illinois uploaded
a photograph of the plaintiff and entered his name when prompted to tag
the face identified in the image.131 According to the complaint, Shutterfly’s
facial recognition software created a “highly detailed ‘map’ or ‘template’”
of the plaintiff’s facial geometry based on “unique contours of his face and
the distances between his eyes, nose and ears.”132 This facial geometric
template allowed Shutterfly to extract and store information about the
plaintiff’s age, gender, race, and geographic location without notice or
consent.133
Similar to its defense in Norberg,134 Shutterfly asserted that, although
a “scan of face geometry” was collected, BIPA excludes from its
protective scope any biometric information derived from photographs.135
To support this assertion, Shutterfly argued that all other terms included
in BIPA’s definition of “biometric identifier” involve “in-person

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
2017).
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Norberg, 152 F. Supp. 3d at 1105–06.
Norberg v. Shutterfly, 152 F. Supp. 3d 1103 (N.D. Ill. 2015).
Id. at 1106.
Id.
Id. at 1105.
Id.
Monroy v. Shutterfly, No. 1:16-cv-10984, 2017 WL 4099846 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 15,
Id. at *1.
Id.
Id.
Norberg, 152 F. Supp. 3d at 1106.
Monroy, 2017 WL 4099846, at *2.
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processes.”136 Dispensing with this argument,137 the court observed that
Shutterfly’s narrow interpretation of the statute would “leave little room
for the law to adapt and respond to technological development.” The
Illinois court reiterated the sentiments of Judge Edmond Chang in a similar
BIPA violation case against Google,138 stating, “[A]dvances in technology
are what drove the Illinois legislature to enact the Privacy Act in the first
place, [so] it is unlikely that the statute sought to limit the definition of
biometric identifier by limiting how the measurements are taken.”139
In practice, BIPA’s private right of action and provision for
protection of individual biometric information (as opposed to regulation
of technology) shows a cogent and effective approach to lawmaking in the
face of rapid and unpredictable advancements in the tech industry. BIPA
seems to benefit from a clear policy and straightforward language, despite
some difficulty with the interpretation of the term “photograph.”140 Thus,
BIPA presents a promising template for a future federal biometric
protection bill.
3. California
The commercial technology industry in California has prompted
several legislative actions. Although these efforts are not always
successful in protecting consumers or even clarifying consumer rights, two
legislative enactments exemplify technology’s impact on California’s
approach to law making.
a. California Online Privacy Protection Act
In 2004, the California Online Privacy Protection Act141 (CalOPPA)
became the first state law requiring websites and online services “that
collect[] personally identifiable information . . . about individual
consumers” to implement and “conspicuously post [a] privacy policy” on
their websites.142 While privacy protection remains the goal of the statute,
its definition of “personally identifiable information” does not include
language that expressly or otherwise protects biometric information.143
136. Id. at *4 (noting that “biometric identifiers” include “retina or iris scans,
fingerprints, voiceprints, and hand scans,” in addition to facial geometric scans.).
137. Id. at *4 (“It appears that fingerprints and retinal scans can be obtained from
images and photographs.”).
138. Rivera v. Google, 238 F. Supp. 3d 1088 (N.D. Ill. 2017).
139. Monroy, 2017 WL 4099846, at *2 (citing Rivera, 238 F. Supp. 3d at 1096).
140. See supra Section II.D.2.
141. California Online Privacy Protection Act, CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22575–79
(West 2018).
142. Id.
143. Id. § 22577.
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The state’s failure to anticipate the rapid evolution of technology prompted
a 2012 announcement from the State Attorney General that CalOPPA
does, in fact, apply to mobile applications of smartphones and tablets.144
The language of the statute does not specifically cover biometric
information, nor does it regulate many of the devices categorized within
the IoT,145 showing how quickly a technology or industry-focused law can
slip into obsolescence if not carefully drafted.
b. The California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018
At the end of June of 2018, California Governor Jerry Brown signed
into law the California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA).146 The law
provides consumers considerable individual oversight of the data collected
by companies operating online as an extension of California’s
fundamental right of privacy.147
The CCPA requires companies that collect personal information to
inform consumers of the categories of data they collect and the purposes
for collection before or at the time of collection.148 The law also provides
consumers a right to know what personal information has been collected
about them.149 Consumers, however, can only obtain this information by
requesting it from the collecting company.150 The statute covers a broad
range of data and notes specifically that the term “personal information”
is inclusive of biometrics.151
In addition to knowledge and access, the statute provides consumers
with a right to have such data deleted.152 This right is hedged by certain
exceptions, allowing companies to refuse to delete consumers’ personal
information in certain circumstances.153 For example, companies are not

144. California Online Privacy Protection Act (CalOPPA), CONSUMER FED’N OF CAL.,
https://bit.ly/2pjyhhq (last updated July 29, 2015).
145. See generally CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22575 (West 2018). The statute does not
prohibit the collection or use of consumer data. Id. Instead, the statute requires commercial
websites and online services to “conspicuously post” privacy policies that include what
types of data the website collects from users. Id. § 22575(a).
146. Ben Adler, California Passes Strict Internet Privacy Law With Implications For
The Country, NPR (June 29, 2018, 5:05 AM), https://n.pr/2MxIVtT.
147. See California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, ch. 55, 2018 Cal. Legis. Serv.
(West) (codified at CAL. CIV. CODE div. 3, pt. 4, tit. 1.81.5).
148. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.100(b) (West 2018).
149. Id. § 1798.100(c).
150. Id.
151. Id. § 1798.140(o)(1)(E). “Biometric information” is defined as “an individual’s
physiological, biological or behavioral characteristics . . . that can be used, singly or in
combination with each other or with other identifying data, to establish individual identity.
Id. § 1798.140(b).
152. Id. § 1798.105(a).
153. Id. § 1798.105(d)(1)–(5).
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required to delete collected data if it is necessary to continue providing the
consumer with a requested service, detect security incidents or illegal
activity, identify and repair software bugs, or exercise free speech.154
Because the CCPA does not go into effect until 2020, uncertainty exists as
to how broadly courts will construe these exceptions, leaving some critics
concerned that the right to delete personal information is a hollow
promise.155
While much of the law’s language shows an intent to empower
citizens in their right to privacy, certain provisions have left privacy
advocates concerned about the law’s adequacy.156 For example, the law
provides citizens the right to forbid companies from selling their collected
data to third parties.157 Furthermore, companies are proscribed from
discriminating against consumers for exercising that right.158 However,
this right, known as an opt-out provision, is not a default; therefore citizens
must first have knowledge of their right to prevent companies from selling
their personal information.159 Another concern is that companies may offer
quality and monetary incentives for the use and sale of consumer
information.160 While consumers cannot be punished for exercising their
rights, others may be compensated for waiving their rights.161 This could
give companies the option to offer a lower-quality service as the default,
reserving premium services for those willing to waive their fundamental
rights to privacy.
Finally, critics have raised concerns over the ability of consumers to
have these rights fully enforced.162 The CCPA provides consumers with a
private right of action, but only in limited circumstances.163 While
consumers can launch a civil suit against companies for disclosure of data
in the event of a security breach, no private right of action is provided in
the event a company refuses to comply with a consumer’s request for data

154. Id.
155. See Adam Schwartz et al., How to Improve the California Consumer Privacy Act
of 2018, ELEC. FRONTIER FOUND. (Aug. 8, 2018), https://bit.ly/2CRoxDe.
156. ACLU Statement: New Law Falls Woefully Short of Protecting Californians’
Privacy, AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF N. CAL. (June 28, 2018) https://bit.ly/2NWfEJM
[hereinafter ACLU Statement].
157. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.120(a).
158. Id. § 1798.125(a)(1). Examples of this include denying or altering the quality of
goods and services provided to customers, or charging a different price for goods or
services because a consumer opted out of third-party data sales. See id. §
1798.125(a)(1)(A)–(D).
159. Id. § 1798.120(a).
160. Id. § 1798.125(b)(1).
161. See generally id. § 1798.125.
162. See ACLU Statement, supra note 156.
163. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.150(a)(1).

2019

FOR SALE: WINDOW TO THE SOUL

799

access, deletion, or prohibition of data sale.164 The Attorney General, on
the other hand, is vested with the authority to prosecute any violation of
the CCPA;165 however, this limited designation of authority may prove
inimical to consumer data protection as seen in jurisdictions where data
statutes lack a private right of action.166
Efforts to appease both consumers and data collectors have resulted
in a promising, but imperfect Act.167 In the time before the law goes into
effect, both consumer privacy advocates and tech companies will be
launching efforts to strengthen-or chip away at-the protections it
affords.168
4. Other State Legislation
Despite the successes of BIPA, efforts by other states to adopt similar
legislation have proven less effective due to small, but significant,
differences in statutory language.169
In 2009, for example, Texas enacted the Capture or Use of Biometric
Identifier Act (CUBI).170 In 2017, Washington enacted legislation
substantively similar to that of Texas,171 though under the Washington law,
data collected from physical or digital photos is not protected.172 Neither
law provides a private right of action for citizens, who must instead appeal
to their respective attorneys general.173
Without a private right of action, some speculate that the laws will
not carry the weight necessary to protect citizens,174 while others contend
that individual causes of action will prove “burdensome” on growth and
innovation of businesses.175 Since its 2009 ratification, CUBI has not been

164. See id. § 1798.150–.155.
165. See id. § 1798.155.
166. See infra Section II.D.3.
167. Harper Neidig, Tech Mobilizes Against California Privacy Law, THE HILL (July 1,
2018, 9:00 AM), https://bit.ly/2yrwhZ4.
168. Id.
169. See Claypool & Stoll, supra note 97; see also Douglas Kelly, Five States Introduce
New Data Security Laws, LAWROOM (Mar. 7, 2017), https://bit.ly/2Jasaog.
170. Capture or Use of Biometric Identifier Act, TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. §
503.001 (West 2017).
171. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.375.010 (West 2018).
172. Kartikay Mehrotra, Tech Companies are Pushing Back Against Biometric Privacy
Laws, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (July 19, 2017, 8:26 PM), https://bloom.bg/2tO6PYp.
173. See TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 503.001(d); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
19.375.030(2).
174. See Paul Shukovsky, Washington Biometric Privacy Law Lacks Teeth of Illinois
Cousin, BLOOMBERG LAW (July 18, 2017), https://www.bna.com/washington-biometricprivacy-n73014461920/ (quoting Drinker Biddle & Reath attorney, Justin O. Kay, as
saying that statutes without individual causes of action “will likely be a footnote.”).
175. See id. (quoting Hutton & Williams privacy attorney, Lisa Sutton).
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used by the State’s attorney general to bring a single suit protecting
citizens’ biometric identifiers.176
Following BIPA’s enactment, large tech companies have begun
lobbying legislators to spike similar enactment efforts.177 Before the
CCPA was enacted, California and Connecticut proposed biometric
privacy bills, both of which passed state assemblies but died in the
senate.178 Montana, Arizona, Missouri, Alaska, New Hampshire, and New
York all made proposals to protect biometric identifiers, many modeled
closely after BIPA, but none made it out of committee.179
As it stands, the arid landscape of federal biometric privacy
protection has prompted states to attempt legislative maneuvers to rectify
this oversight with varying degrees of success. The vast majority of
citizens, however, remain vulnerable to exploitation by private data
collectors at a time when data is becoming more sensitive, and collection
is becoming more invasive.
E.

International Protection of Biometric Data

The ever-expanding reach of companies like Google and Facebook
implicates the privacy concerns of consumers outside the United States.180
Acknowledging the continued failure of legislation on home soil, and
showing thoughtful concern for the sensitivity of personal information, as
well as the ongoing risk of breach, the European Union has set a new
standard in data protection that has forced many American-based
companies to alter their practices.
1. General Data Protection Regulation
The European Union’s recent General Data Protection Regulation
(GDPR),181 presents a thoughtful and comprehensive step toward
protecting the rights of individual consumers in contrast to the patchwork,
industry-focused regulatory fabric of the United States.
The GDPR assigns to EU citizens a right to their data.182 In so doing,
the GDPR imposes upon companies several obligations intended to

176. Mehrotra, supra note 172.
177. Id.
178. Id.; see also A.B. 83, 2015–2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2015).
179. Mehrotra, supra note 172; see Shukovsky, supra note 174; H.B. 144, 28th Leg.,
1st Sess. (Alaska 2013); A.B. 5232, 2017–2018 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2017).
180. Kris Lahiri, What Is General Data Protection Regulation?, FORBES (Feb. 14,
2018, 01:21 PM), https://bit.ly/2Ds9uj3.
181. Regulation 2016/679, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1 (EU).
182. Id. art. 1. The Regulation provides for the “protection of natural persons in relation
to the processing of personal data” as a “fundamental right.” Id.
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increase data-holder transparency and user autonomy on the Internet.183
The language of the regulation is broad, suggesting a cooperative
understanding between the legislative and judicial bodies that will allow
courts to interpret the language dynamically as technology changes.184 For
example, Article 24 of the GDPR refers to the responsibility of data
controllers to “implement appropriate . . . measures to ensure . . . that
processing is performed in accordance with” the rights of citizens laid out
in the regulation.185 The use of the term “appropriate” shows an
understanding that effective security precautions will change with
technology.
Along with the broad language, similar deference is given to
supervisory authorities for purposes of determining fines for GDPR
violations.186 The GDPR has no hardline rules on punishment, but notes
that the supervisory authority “shall ensure” that administrative fines are
“effective, proportionate, and dissuasive.”187 Fines can be up to “4% of
annual global turnover.”188 Already, Google has run afoul of the
regulation, incurring a €50 million fine in France for failing to obtain
“valid consent” when collecting data for targeted advertisements.189
In addition to the sweeping responsibility to implement appropriate
safeguards, the GDPR enumerates several specific rights which shape the
more general “right to data” now held by EU citizens.190 Primarily, the
GDPR (1) provides EU citizens with the right to know if a website,
business, or other control is collecting personal data and if so, what data is
being collected and the extent to which that data is being used;191 (2)
provides users with a right to correct personal information if found to be
inaccurate;192 and (3) codifies the oft-debated “right to erasure,” granting
a “data subject” the right to have personal data concerning him or her
erased by the collecting company “without undue delay,”193 as well as
requiring data collectors to inform affiliated data users of the erasure
request to ensure complete deletion.194
To increase awareness and transparency, the GDPR delineates data
collector obligations in a way that demystifies questions of liability, and
183. See id. arts. 24–43.
184. See id. art. 24.
185. Id.
186. See id. art. 83.
187. Id. art. 83(1).
188. GDPR FAQs, EU GDPR, https://bit.ly/2PcmAqH (last visited Dec. 10, 2018).
189. Vincent Manancourt & Tom Webb, Google Ordered to Pay First Multi-million
GDPR Fine, LEXOLOGY (Jan. 29, 2019), https://bit.ly/2TOOED1.
190. See, e.g., Regulation 2016/679, supra note 181, arts. 15–17.
191. Id. art. 15.
192. Id. art. 16.
193. Id. art. 17(1).
194. Id. art. 17(2).
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explains the general protocol companies must take in the event of
breach.195 Foremost, the GDPR requires data-holders to notify citizens of
data compromise within seventy-two hours of becoming aware of the
breach.196 The GDPR enumerates a list of information the controller is
required to provide to the consumer in order to adequately satisfy the
regulation’s notice requirement,197 including the contact information of a
data protection officer from whom more information can be obtained.198
Second, the GDPR imparts cooperative liability on companies and
their associated data processors.199 Article 28 places a burden on data
controllers not to contract with a processor unless it “provid[es] sufficient
guarantees to implement appropriate . . . measures” to “ensure the
protection of the rights” of EU citizens.200 In addition, processors are
prohibited from engaging with other processors “without prior specific or
general written authorisation of the controller,” increasing transparency by
requiring a sort of chain of title for data use and transfer.201
Finally, and most importantly, the GDPR provides for a private right
of action, which is imperative if a data protection statute is to prove
effective.202 Article 82 permits any individual who “has suffered material
or non-material damage” as a result of a GDPR violation to seek an award
“from the controller or processor for the damage suffered.”203
The EU’s GDPR provides an insightful and adaptable example of
data protection, from which the United States can learn. On a federal level,
no remotely comparable protection exists, but concerns over biometric
data privacy have prompted several states to enact data protection statutes,
though few have been effective. Consumers are thus left with no right to
their own uniquely sensitive and irreplaceable biometric data. Given the
amount and nature of the information that can be gathered through
biometrics, nothing short of federal legislation will be adequate to protect
U.S. citizens.
III.

ANALYSIS

Even a cursory glance at the technological landscape in the United
States today reveals an overwhelming view of user data as a commodity
rather than a virtual manifestation of an individual’s most private
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

See id. arts. 24, 28, 33(1).
Id. art. 33(1).
Id. art. 33(3).
Id. art. 33(3)(b).
See id. art. 28.
Regulation 2016/679, supra note 181, art. 28(1).
Id. art. 28(2).
See supra Section II.D.3.
Regulation 2016/679, supra note 181, art. 82(1).

2019

FOR SALE: WINDOW TO THE SOUL

803

information.204 The vast universe of the IoT will not cease to expand; it is
simply too valuable.205 The breakneck speed at which the IoT is growing
indicates that previously unimaginable technological advances are right
around the corner. While the climate of technological innovation portends
economic boon, the price paid is the privacy of millions of citizens.
A.

Biometric Data is Uniquely Sensitive

Without question, biometric identifiers such as fingerprints, gait,
heart rate, or face scans are uniquely personal and revealing of their
owners.206 Eye tracking, however, sits atop the list as perhaps the most
sensitive, and most valuable identifier, and is thus the perfect example of
why biometric data needs legislative protection on a national scale.207
Because pupillary motility cannot be consciously controlled, and eye
movement can only be controlled to a certain extent, our eyes are our mostexternal, least-inhibited projectors of brain activity.208 That companies,
researchers, and algorithms are able to extract meaning from the recorded
“messages”—sent from brain to body and expressed through the eyes—
suggests that in a rudimentary sense, eye tracking allows for the reading
of minds.209 This is true in a medical sense (translating occulomotor
responses to make a diagnosis) and in a behavioral context (reading
messages from the brain to study interest, arousal, or decision-making).210
For example, suppose a teen receives a VR headset for his birthday.
He uses it to play a popular game about superheroes, displayed as
characteristically muscled and scantily clad. The player, knowingly or not,
will spend more time looking at favored characters. This visual stimulus
204. Abhas Ricky, What Should Be Your Data Monetization Strategy to Compete in the
Borderless Economy? FORBES (May 8, 2018, 9:45 AM), https://bit.ly/2CXhtFo; see also
Alessio Botta et al., Monetizing Data: A New Source of Value in Payments, MCKINSEY &
CO. (Sept. 2017), https://mck.co/2AlFKlP.
205. Theo Priestly, The Internet Of Things Is A Fragmented $19 Trillion Roulette
Gamble, FORBES (Oct. 5, 2015), https://bit.ly/2yvo1Hc. Forbes anticipates a $19 trillion
valuation of the IoT in 2020. Id.
206. ERIKA MCCALLISTER ET AL., NAT’L. INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., NIST SPEC.
PUBLICATION NO. 800-122, GUIDE TO PROTECTING THE CONFIDENTIALITY OF PERSONALLY
IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION (PII) 2-1 to -2 (2010), http://bit.ly/2G73bUL. The National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) lists biometric data as one form of Personally
Identifiable Information, which it defines as “any information about an individual
maintained by an agency, including (1) any information that can be used to distinguish or
trace an individual’s identity . . . and (2) any other information that is linked or linkable to
an individual . . . .” Id.
207. See supra Section II.A.
208. See supra Section II.A.
209. See Eckstein et al., supra note 17, at 70 (explaining that scientists have lauded eye
tracking for its ability to “provide an ideal neuroscience model to investigate association
between brain mechanisms and behavior”).
210. See supra Section II.A.
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elicits a pupillary dilation from the user without the user’s knowledge.211
That biometric data, including where the user looked, for how long, and
how the pupil reacted, might be considered “supplemental data.”212
Synthesized with “enterprise-level data”213 to create a user model, this
profile of a young consumer can be sold to a purveyor of targeted
advertising.214
Having analyzed the data and derived meaning from the reaction to
superhero stimuli, the company determines that advertising highlighting
the male figure will be most effective on this individual, and in doing so
either correctly (or incorrectly) infers a conclusion about the user’s
sexuality.215 “Sex sells,” as the adage goes. Advertisers have a higher
chance of selling a product if they know the sexual interests of a targeted
consumer – but imagine if a company, quietly collecting data, targets
suggestive advertisements at a consumer before his friends, parents, or
even he himself fully understands those interests. If such information can
be derived from eye movement, and there is no legislation to prevent its
collection, it will be analyzed, stored, and sold. Without controls on data
sale, information gleaned from user behavior may even lead to
discrimination by employers or insurance providers.216
B.

Protection of Biometric Data is a Right, Not an Option

VR applications span swaths of fields and interests from military
training and mechanical troubleshooting217 to entertainment, and travel,
suggesting VR and AR will be used by consumers of every kind.218 The
211. See supra Section II.A.
212. Botta et al., supra note 204. Supplemental data is a broad classification spanning
from “raw data derived from external sources such as social media, weather data, and
digital IDs to synthesized, value-added analytics that [can be] captured through predictive
modelling, [or] sentiment analysis . . . .” Id.
213. Id. Enterprise-level data refers to information provided directly to a company for
the use of its product or service (e.g., user preferences and settings). Id.
214. Id. (explaining that companies can “extract value through the monetization of the
data itself . . . through third parties.”); see also Michael Fertik, Your Future Employer is
Watching You Online. You Should Be, Too., HARV. BUS. REV. (Apr. 3, 2012),
https://bit.ly/2P9tNYR.
215. See Rieger & Savin-Williams, supra note 42, at 6 (“Results suggested that pupil
dilation is a significant indicator of sexual orientation.”); see also supra Section II.A.
216. Marshall Allen, Health Insurers Are Vacuuming Up Details About You — And It
Could Raise Your Rates, PROPUBLICA (July 17, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://bit.ly/2NnbLgX;
see also Fertik, supra note 214.
217. Lauren Goode, Microsoft’s HoloLens 2 Puts a Full-Fledged Computer on Your
Face, WIRED (Feb. 24, 2019, 12:20 PM), https://bit.ly/2XjOEK1.
218. See Howie Leibach, Meet the Consumers That Will Make or Break Virtual Reality
Next Year, SINGULARITYHUB (Dec. 17, 2015), https://bit.ly/2q2upRB (finding that,
although male millennials are the “most aware” of VR, the majority of those polled,
including Baby Boomers express interest in experiencing VR); see also Aaron Burch, VR
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“truthful” nature of the information derived from eye movement will
provide companies with personal information about users without their
knowledge.219 To exploit such information for profit is to violate an
individual’s right to privacy in a significant way.220
Outlining a proposed Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights, a 2012 White
House report noted, “Consumers have a right to expect that companies will
collect, use, and disclose personal data in ways that are consistent with the
context in which consumers provide the data.”221 An expectation of
privacy is sure to be violated when information derived from reflexive or
impulsive movements–sometimes knowingly, but more often
unknowingly made–are used to collect information about an individual
wholly unrelated to the task or activity for which the device was used in
the first place.
The sheer volume of valuable information that can be derived from
eye-tracking data222 makes it unlikely that companies will retain data
solely to improve their products when, perhaps, more demand exists for
the data than the product.223 Companies and users are quick to extol the
realism brought to VR by technology like foveated rendering,224 but do so
without consideration for the sensitivity of the data relinquished in the
process.225 Although an immersive VR experience is an achievement
worthy of pursuit and excitement, a tool as powerful as eye tracking should
be incorporated into toys or home entertainment systems with equal
consideration for the concomitant privacy implications.

and Consumer Sentiment, TOUCHSTONE RESEARCH (Jan. 28, 2016), https://bit.ly/2R3q2Bm
(“While interest and appeal of VR does decline with age, there remains a substantial level
of interest even among Baby Boomers (64% are positive towards VR and about half are
interested).”).
219. See Costandi, supra note 26; Robertson, supra note 28.
220. While this statement is an assertion by the author, the sentiment is reflected and
supported by the policy and purpose behind data privacy statutes such as BIPA and the
CCPA. See supra Sections II.D.1., II.D.3.b.
221. U.S. WHITE HOUSE OFFICE, CONSUMER DATA PRIVACY IN A NETWORKED WORLD:
A FRAMEWORK FOR PROTECTING PRIVACY AND PROMOTING INNOVATION IN THE GLOBAL
DIGITAL ECONOMY 1 (2012), https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=700959.
222. Allen, supra note 216. A former Aetna employee described the insurer’s purchase
of data sets describing “hundreds of personal details” about millions of Americans. Id.
223. Ricky, supra note 204 (“While many companies are entrenched in programs to
use big data to help make better-informed decisions, the next step . . . is to turn that
information into profit.”).
224. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
225. See Hardawar, supra note 49.
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The Federal Government is Currently Inadequate in its
Biometric Protection

Currently, the FTC Act permits only the Commission or the Attorney
General to bring actions for personal privacy violations,226 which are
brought almost exclusively on behalf of large classes in the event of a
substantial breach.227 Due to the lack of federal statutes protecting
biometrics and other data privacy, the “unfair and deceptive” language of
Section 5 of the FTC Act has been applied only to companies that have
misrepresented or violated their own terms of use and self-imposed
privacy policies.228 Leaving regulation in the hands of those collecting
undeniably valuable data is like letting the CEO of Exxon determine best
practices in a world without the EPA. It appears that the FTC has never
pursued a case regarding the improper collection, sale, or use of biometric
data, though it maintains the authority to act in the event of unfair or
deceptive practices involving the misuse of biometric information.229 Still
in its incipiency, Illinois’s BIPA has been used several times to protect the
bioinformatic rights of individuals and classes to great effect.230
D.

The Federal Government is Poised to Support a National
Statute Protecting Biometric Data

“Congress is good at two things: doing nothing, and overreacting. So
far, we’ve done nothing on Facebook . . . We’re getting ready to
overreact.”231 After Cambridge Analytica and potentially other third
parties accessed the data of nearly 87 million Facebook users, CEO Mark
Zuckerberg spent two days before Congress fielding questions,
226. See 15 U.S.C. § 56 (2012 & Supp. 2017).
227. See, e.g., Ashley Madison FTC Settlement, supra note 68 (noting that the Ashley
Madison breach affected 36 million account holders); Operator of Online Tax Preparation
Service Agrees to Settle FTC Charges That it Violated Financial Privacy and Security
Rules, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Aug. 29, 2017), https://bit.ly/2iZXTeY (explaining that
TaxSlayer’s failure to “implement safeguards to protect the security, confidentiality and
integrity of customer information” resulted in the hackers gaining full access to over 9,000
user accounts); Uber Settles FTC Allegations that It Made Deceptive Privacy and Data
Security Claims, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Aug. 15, 2017), https://bit.ly/2uY81Jj (detailing
Uber’s failure to provide “reasonable security to prevent unauthorized access” to
consumers’ data, resulting in the breach of over 100,000 drivers’ names and license
numbers).
228. See Peppet, supra note 61, at 137.
229. Michael P. Daly et al., Biometrics Litigation: An Evolving Landscape, DRINKER
BIDDLE (Apr. 1, 2016), http://bit.ly/2AkVKEE.
230. See supra Part II.C.2. (describing numerous cases involving BIPA violations that
have returned with verdicts for the plaintiffs).
231. Facebook: Transparency and Use of Consumer Data: Hearing Before the H.
Comm. on Energy & Commerce, 115th Cong. 161–62 (2018) (prelim. transcript)
[hereinafter Facebook Hearing], http://bit.ly/2UsrQXf (statement of Rep. Billy Long).
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apologizing for abusing users’ trust, and vowing to improve Facebook’s
practices.232 Well before Zuckerberg’s public admonishment, Facebook
purchased Oculus VR for $2 billion.233 The broad commercial viability of
VR and AR, and the insufficiency of state governments to provide
adequate data protection, suggests that now is an appropriate time to
implement a federal biometric privacy statute.
The looming threat of massive fines under the GDPR or from the
FTC234 have prompted Facebook and other tech giants to proactively
discuss potential federal data protection legislation.235 Large companies
are concerned that without a uniform law to guide standards and practices,
states will continue to draft and enact their own.236 In drafts of federal
legislative proposals, tech companies emphatically seek two provisions: a
pre-emption clause to supersede state laws like BIPA, and an exclusive
grant of enforcement authority to the FTC.237
Even before the Cambridge Analytica breach, the apparent success
of BIPA prompted proposals of similar statutes by many other states.238
However, the legislation’s efficacy has prompted lobbyists from massive
tech companies to spike the passage of similar statutes in a staggering
number of states.239 The push for state preemption and FTC oversight
portends ineffective regulation if tech companies achieve their goals in
shaping legislation.
IV.

RECOMMENDATION

The sensitivity of biometric data, increased use in eye-tracking
research, and projected explosion of eye-tracking technology in the
consumer market all suggest a need for statutory data protection. While a
broad statute protecting all personal data is advisable, any new legislation
must specifically provide for, or cover by broad definition, biometric
information protection.
232. Georgia Wells & John D. McKinnon, Facebook Data on 87 Million Users May
Have Been Improperly Shared, WALL STREET J. (Apr. 4, 2018, 9:19 PM),
https://on.wsj.com/2GZO0wc.
233. Chris Welch, Facebook Buying Oculus VR for $2 Billion, THE VERGE (March 25,
2014, 5:34 PM), https://bit.ly/2ybNPWn.
234. Tony Romm & Craig Timberg, FTC opens investigation into Facebook after
Cambridge Analytica scrapes millions of users’ personal information, WASH. POST (Mar.
20, 2018), https://wapo.st/2q5uqVc.
235. Dina Temple-Raston, Why The Tech Industry Wants Federal Control Over Data
Privacy Law, NPR (Oct. 8, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://n.pr/2OJcVrt.
236. See supra Section II.C.3. The myriad states that have implemented or attempted
to pass biometric privacy laws run the gamut of red, blue, and purple states, indicating
widespread concern for data protection. Id.
237. Temple-Raston, supra note 235.
238. See supra Section II.C.3.
239. See Mehrotra, supra note 172.
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The Statute Must Provide Users a Right to Their Data

The CCPA expands the inalienable right to privacy of all California
citizens to include online data.240 The GDPR likewise shows respect for
the right of an individual to own and control his or her data, by using broad
language to prescribe and protect citizen rights rather than prohibit the
behavior of a company or industry.241 Broad, inclusive language
conferring upon users the right to their data shows regard for fundamental
rights of individuals and ensures longevity of the statute.242 Broad and
inclusive language akin to that in the GDPR and CCPA forces companies
to be mindful of consumer rights as they innovate, and prevents the need
for new laws as innovation renders existing laws obsolete or inadequate.
Thus, the federal statute must provide users a right to their personal data.
To countenance the provision of a fundamental right to one’s data,
the proposed statute should provide users with a right to access, deletion,
and refusal of sale, similar to the provisions enumerated in the GDPR and
CCPA.243 Such provisions comport with some of the most fundamental
and long-standing pillars of property and ownership in legal
jurisprudence,244 and should not be discarded simply because the property
in question is digital.
Further, the statute should mandate opt-in data use policies instead of
the opt-out provisions.245 If a right is truly fundamental, one should not
have to know the right exists in order to exercise or protect it. An opt-in
data retention default supports the policy of unfettered user ownership and
240. See California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018, ch. 55, § 2(a), 2018 Cal. Legis.
Serv. (West) (“Fundamental to this right of privacy is the ability of individuals to control
the use, including the sale, of their personal information.”).
241. See Regulation 2016/679, supra note 181, art. 24. The GDPR imparts
responsibility on data controllers to “implement appropriate . . . measures to ensure . . . that
processing is performed in accordance with” the rights of citizens laid out in the regulation.
Id.
242. See CONSUMER FED’N OF CAL., supra note 144. Less than a decade after its
adoption, CalOPPA had to be clarified, and subsequently amended to account for the rapid
changes in technology. Id. The upshot here is that tech- or industry-focused statutes stay
relevant for less time than laws assigning an inalienable right.
243. See supra Section II.D.3.B.
244. See J.E. Penner, The “Bundle of Rights” Picture of Property, 43 UCLA L. Rev.
711, 732 (1996) (citing A.M. Honore, Ownership, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN JURISPRUDENCE
107, 112–24 (A.G. Guest ed., 1961)). Ownership of property confers upon the owner a
right to use, transfer, alienate, lease, or destroy the item or parcel in concert with a duty to
prevent harm. Id. These rights should apply in equal measure to data once ownership is
established as a matter of law.
245. See Luke Irwin, GDPR: When Do You Need to Seek Consent?, IT GOVERNANCE
(Aug. 30, 2017), http://bit.ly/2B6WHji. “Opt-in” refers to a policy that requires a user to
give informed consent to a certain action such as collection or sale of data. Id. “Opt-out”
policies are much more popular and assume consent to use data until the user actively
rescinds that consent. Id.
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autonomy while an opt-out default indicates a preference toward datacollecting companies through a pre-supposed waiver of rights.246
To balance the needs of consumers with those of companies, the
proposed statutes should accord users the choice to waive some rights.
Thus, if users choose to waive certain protections, companies may reward
or otherwise compensate users for their data and information. However,
the methods by which companies incentivize customers to waive their
rights must be carefully monitored to avoid coercive or unfair practices.
Certain fundamental rights should remain inalienable and nonwaivable regardless of incentive. The choice to have data collected and
sold by companies should be left to users; however, the right to (1) see
what is collected, (2) correct inaccurate information, (3) know the purpose
of its collection, and (4) know the places to which it is being sold or
transferred must be immune from waiver. This will allow users and
companies to benefit from the value of user data while remaining
transparent about the process.
B.

The Statute Must Protect Biometric Data Specifically

A sweeping data protection statute will encompass myriad forms of
data; however, no data is more sensitive than biometrics,247 and thus the
statute must provide explicitly for biometric data protection. Although the
CCPA is not a biometric-specific statute, the law casts a wide definition
of “personal information,” which includes biometric data.248 The statute
offers further clarity by offering an illustrative, but non-exhaustive
definition of “biometric information.”249 A federal statute must follow this
example. Illustrative definitions make legal interpretation easier for
courts,250 and non-exhaustive definitions ensure longevity of the statute by
leaving open the possibility of protection for biometric identifiers that
have not yet been explored or exploited by technological innovation.
Ambiguous language can frustrate the efficacy of the statute,251 and
thus the language of BIPA and its analysis in court should be considered
in the process of drafting a federal statute. Language excluding
“information derived from . . . photographs” from the statute’s protection
was addressed to determine if the term referred to physical photographs or

246. See supra Section II.D.3.b.
247. See supra Section II.A.–.B.
248. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.140 (West 2018).
249. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
250. See In re Facebook Biometric Info. Privacy Litig., 185 F. Supp. 3d 1155, 1171
(N.D. Cal. 2016) (relying on the enumerated exclusions to interpret ambiguous language
in favor of plaintiff class); see also Section II.D.2.a.
251. See supra Section II.D.2.a.
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digitized images.252 The court construed in favor of the statute’s overall
policy of biometric protection,253 but ambiguity in the language presented
the risk of a gaping hole in the statute’s coverage.254 Drafters of a federal
statute should avoid such ambiguities to ensure comprehensive protection
for consumers.
C.

The Statute Must Provide for a Private Right of Action

While the gravamen of this comment is the importance of statutory
protection of biometric identifiers, a private right of action is of
tantamount importance if the statute is to have any commendable impact.
The right of an individual to sue privately under the statute further supports
the idea that biometric data and information is emphatically the property
of its owner by placing the ability to protect that property in the owner’s
hands.
Exclusive FTC oversight will prove insufficient to protect the rights
granted to users.255 The FTC’s reach is broad, but adding responsibility as
massive as biometric data regulation will only bloat the Commission,
resulting in an emaciated process of investigation and litigation. As it
stands, the FTC is only open to investigating the most egregious and
expansive data breaches.256 The proposal by large companies for exclusive
FTC oversight is unsurprising, but dangerous if implemented.
The risk of over-burden and under-performance is the same reason
this Comment advocates for a statute rather than a regulation. While an
agency devoted to the protection of user data is compelling, the agency’s
efficacy would ebb and flow with administrative changes and fluctuations
in budget. This is not to say that agencies are useless in the effort to protect
user data. The FTC’s ability to investigate substantial violations and
prosecute vast class-action suits makes it a welcome partner in the effort
to protect user privacy. Biometric identifiers, however, are too uniquely
sensitive to be protected differently year-to-year, or solely in the event of
massive breach. Consumers deserve as much the right to own their
biometric data as they do the right to defend it.
V.

CONCLUSION

The wave of VR and AR is cresting, bringing with it new forms of
entertainment for all ages.257 As technology evolves and Americans invite
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.

In re Facebook, 185 F. Supp. 3d at 1170.
See id. at 1171.
See supra Section II.D.2.A.
Temple-Raston, supra note 233.
See supra Section II.C.1.
See supra Section III.B.
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more immersive and invasive forms of entertainment into their homes,
federal laws need to reflect an understanding of the risks of innovation by
protecting individual rights of privacy rather than regulating technology.
While some state laws have been enacted to protect the biometric data of
individuals,258 others have fallen short in ways that essentially nullify the
efforts of lawmakers to enact lasting policy.259
In the excitement that has surrounded VR for decades, little research
has been compiled to show how much personal information can be derived
from the involuntary movements of eyes and pupils.260 In the remaining
moments before VR becomes a part of every-day life, a federal statute
must be enacted to ensure that safety and privacy are concomitant with the
use and enjoyment of new technology capable of collecting biometric
information.

258. See supra Section II.D.1–.2.
259. See supra Section II.D.3.
260. See supra Section II.A.

